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471 
ADJUDICATING THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
IN THREE EASY STEPS 
 
David M. Schlachter* 
INTRODUCTION 
Celebrities’ names, images, and identities are unique and 
valuable entities.1 The right of publicity was created to protect 
these entities. While celebrities usually have wealth, fame, and 
prestige, they also have the right of publicity to protect their 
personas. This additional advantage is warranted because 
celebrities have a set of heightened property and privacy interests 
in their personas.2 The right of publicity, therefore, makes it 
unlawful to misappropriate a valuable identity without permission.3 
Courts have historically struggled to define the right of 
publicity. This difficulty is apparent in inconsistent approaches to 
defining the right.4 Without a firm definition of the right of 
publicity, courts are left to question its necessity, how far the right 
should extend, and who may bring a cause of action under the 
right’s authority. Furthermore, issues such as whether the right of 
publicity is derived from privacy or property jurisprudence, and 
                                                          
* B.A., Brooklyn College, CUNY; J.D. candidate, 2006, Brooklyn Law 
School. The author extends his sincere gratitude to Professor Aaron D. Twerski 
for his guidance, and to Brooke Crescenti, Michael Freedman, and Beth 
Lemanowicz for their stellar efforts in preparing this Note for publication. 
1 A celebrity is one that is widely known or celebrated, or is honored for 
some signal achievement. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 n.3 (6th 
Cir. 2003). A celebrity does not have to be a member of the entertainment 
world. Id. 
2 See text infra § I. 
3 Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
4 See text infra §I. 
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whether the First Amendment right to freedom of expression 
serves to limit or expand the right of publicity, also contribute to 
the confusion surrounding this right. Such uncertainty has led 
courts to apply varying and divergent methods of adjudicating a 
right of publicity cause of action. Therefore, both plaintiffs and 
defendants are left with little guidance on how to litigate cases 
which deal with the right of publicity. 
The purpose of this Note is to untangle the right of publicity 
and annunciate its defining issues. Part I explains the right’s 
foundation and the various privacy and property interests that the 
right of publicity protects. Part II discusses the interaction of the 
right of publicity with the First Amendment, explaining how 
varying degrees of First Amendment protection act as a restraint on 
the right of publicity. Part III highlights the necessity of a new 
uniform test and examines flaws in current right of publicity 
jurisprudence, reflecting a lack of understanding of the right that 
leads to confusion and injustice. Finally, Part IV suggests a new 
three-prong test to consistently adjudicate right of publicity actions 
and applies the new test to several fact patterns for illustrative 
purposes. 
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
In order to understand the right of publicity, one must first have 
an understanding of its roots in the law. The right of publicity has 
no direct ancestor in common law. Rather, it developed from two 
areas of law: privacy5 and intellectual property.6 The term “right of 
publicity” was first coined in the 1953 case of Haelan 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.7 In Haelan, the 
court derived the right of publicity from the right to privacy, 
                                                          
5 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
967 (10th Cir. 1996) (the right of publicity “was originally intertwined with the 
right of privacy”). 
6 Parks, 329 F.3d at 449. The court points out that right of publicity claims 
follow those of trademark claimsthat the two causes of action are similar. Id. 
at 447. Thereby, the court asserts that the right of publicity falls under the 
general category of intellectual property. Id. at 449. 
7 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
SCHLACHTER MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006  12:42 PM 
 RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 473 
holding that individuals have a right to be protected from unwanted 
public exposure.8 The court coined the term “right of publicity 
because it protected the publicity value of one’s photograph.”9 The 
right also drew from property law, as the Supreme Court 
acknowledged in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.10 
In Zacchini, the Court held that if there is market value in any part 
of a person, such as the person’s image, that person should be able 
to protect that value through equitable and monetary remedies.11 
Thus, the holdings in Haelan Laboratories and Zacchini 
demonstrate that the right of publicity was earliest identified as a 
unique derivative of both privacy and property jurisprudence. 
A. The Privacy Aspect of the Right of Publicity 
The right of publicity is partly derived from the right to 
privacy.12 At common law, an individual’s right to privacy can be 
invaded in a variety of ways.13 One type of invasion of the right to 
                                                          
8 Id. See also Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 
2001). 
9 Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 868. 
10 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977). 
11 Id. In other words, if a celebrity has market value in his or her likeness, 
i.e., his or her photograph can be sold in the free market, then that celebrity 
should be granted some sort of protection for that likeness. This protection will 
bar the use of the likeness by others without permission. See id. Since this 
ruling, many other courts have followed this line of reasoning and have ruled 
that the right of publicity is a right derived from intellectual property law. See, 
e.g., Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 459 (6th Cir. 2003). 
12 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003). See 
also Parks, 329 F.3d at 445 (stating that the Lanham Act, to which right of 
publicity is similar, is rooted in the right to privacy); Landham v. Lewis Galoob 
Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2000); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 1996); Haelan Labratories, 
202 F.2d at 868; Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 920 (N.D. Ohio 
2004) (stating that the right of publicity is derived from the common law right to 
privacy); Zoll v. Ruder Finn, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4129 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004); Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799. 
13 Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 919. The four categories are: (1) “Intrusion 
upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude,” or into private affairs; (2) Public 
exposure of private facts about the plaintiff; (3) “Publicity which places the 
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privacy akin to the right of publicity is the appropriation of an 
individual’s name or image for another’s advantage.14 This type of 
misappropriation served as the basis for the right of publicity’s 
roots in privacy law.15 “Name or image” is the persona or publicity 
value that a celebrity is trying to protect.16 The appropriation of the 
name or image of another, for one’s own benefit, has been 
extended from a cause of action of the right to privacy to a cause of 
action under the right of publicity.17 In fact, when both causes of 
action are applicable, many courts limit the pleadings to only the 
claims under the right of publicity.18 
Deriving the right of publicity from the common law of privacy 
has various implications.19 For example, while New York 
recognizes the right of publicity, the state imposes limitations 
owing to its privacy law jurisprudence.20 The New York courts 
have ruled that because the right of publicity is grounded in 
theories of privacy, it only protects identity so long as the injured 
party is alive,21 holding that there is no privacy issue after a person 
dies.22 New York has also limited the right of publicity’s remedies 
                                                          
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye” and (4) Appropriation of the plaintiff’s 
identity for the defendant’s benefit. Id. 
14 Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 n.2 (Cal. 2001). See 
also Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 919. 
15 Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 799; Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 919. 
16 Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 919. “In asserting that Defendants breached 
her ‘common law right to persona and image,’ Plaintiff Bosley alleges the fourth 
cause of actionappropriation of her name or likeness for the defendant’s 
advantage.” Id. 
17 Landham, 227 F.3d at 622. 
18 The right of publicity extends beyond the general right to privacy. Parks 
v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003). Therefore, the right of 
publicity incorporates the right to privacy claim. See id. 
19 As a consequence of deriving the right of publicity from the common law 
right of privacy, the right of publicity has non-economic attributes. Since many 
courts find the right of publicity to have been created through the right to 
privacy, those courts attribute several non-economic values to the right. See text 
infra this section. 
20 Zoll v. Ruder Finn Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4129 at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
21 Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d. 620, 621 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1977); Zoll, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4129 at *7. 
22 Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d at 621. 
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to injunctive relief and nominal damages,23 because the theoretical 
basis of privacy law is to prevent injury to feelings. 24 Thus, most 
awards in actions for the wrongful invasion of an individual’s right 
of publicity in New York, and other states which view the right of 
publicity wholly as a derivative of the right to privacy, are limited 
to nominal damages. 25 
Holding that the right of publicity is derived from privacy also 
implicates the remedy of unjust enrichment.26 “Unjust enrichment 
is a judicially created remedy for avoiding benefit to one to the 
unfair detriment of another.”27 Indeed, the remedy of unjust 
enrichment rests on the basis that allowing the free appropriation 
of a celebrity’s identity serves no social purpose.28 In order to 
establish a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that (1) the defendant received a benefit, (2) at 
plaintiff’s expense, (3) under circumstances that would make it 
unjust for the defendant to retain benefit without paying for it.29 
Thus, appropriating the likeness of another for capital gain, 
without permission, will serve as the basis for an unjust enrichment 
claim, because the celebrity loses marketability of the likeness 
                                                          
23 Zoll, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4129 at *7. 
24 Lombardo, 58 A.D.2d at 621. 
In New York there is a distinction between the statutory right which 
protects the living persons from commercial exploitation of their names 
and pictures without their written consents, as embodied in sections 50 
and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, and the common-law 
property right in one’s public personality. The statutory right is deemed 
a ‘right of privacy’ and is based upon the classic right of privacy’s 
theoretical base, which is to prevent injury to feelings. Accordingly, in 
most cases where damages have been awarded under the Civil Rights 
law, they have been nominal. 
Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
25 Id. 
26 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
976 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 
U.S. 562, 576 (1977)). 
27 Martinez v. Colo. Dep’t. of Human Servs., 97 P.3d 152, 159 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
28 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976. 
29 Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1221 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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while the appropriator receives economic benefit.30 
B. The Property Aspect of the Right of Publicity 
In addition to privacy characteristics, many courts attribute 
property interests to the right of publicity.31 Even Haelan 
Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,32 which considered the 
right as mainly a protection of the privacy interest of ballplayers, 
stated that there is some economic, or property, aspect to the right 
of publicity.33 Furthermore, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co., the United States Supreme Court noted that the 
right of publicity exists more to protect an individual’s right to 
reap the rewards of his endeavors than to protect an individual’s 
feelings or reputation.34 Trademark law plays a key role in this 
respect.35 Thus, the concept of the economic property value of the 
Fifth Amendment has developed as an equal or competing issue 
alongside the personal privacy interests in the right of publicity. 
In order to prevail on a right of publicity claim, one need not be 
a celebrity.36 As far as the economic property value is concerned, 
courts have long recognized the property interests in identities as 
                                                          
30 Id. For further explanation of how the celebrity loses likeness 
marketability, see text infra Part III(A). 
31 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 967. Although many courts consider the right as a 
legislative offspring of the right to privacy, most find several additional property 
interests in the right of publicity. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575-76; Donchez, 
392 F.3d at 1220; ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 
2003); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447 (6th Cir. 2003); Hoffman v. 
Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001); Landham v. 
Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 622-23 (6th Cir. 2000); Cardtoons, 95 
F.3d at 973; Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 
866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 920 
(N.D. Ohio 2004); Zoll v. Ruder Finn, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4129 at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 
2001) (all attributing property characteristics to the right of publicity). 
32 202 F.2d at 868. This court first coined the term “right of publicity.” 
33 Id. 
34 433 U.S. 562, 575-76 (1977). 
35 Parks, 329 F.3d at 460; Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 920. 
36 Landham v. Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2000). 
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the inherent right of every person to control the commercial value 
of his or her identity.37 However, this right extends only to 
individuals that have an identity with commercial value.38 It is this 
value that the right of publicity is protecting.39 The identity of an 
individual, thus, has pecuniary value with accompanying rights 
which may be asserted if that value is diminished by the wrongful 
actions of someone else.40 
A valuable identity is created by a mixture of hard work and 
talent.41 A highly valuable identity is attained when the name, 
image, or likeness of an individual is readily identifiable to the 
public.42 Celebrities, or those individuals who have achieved a 
highly valuable identity, should have the right to enjoy the fruits of 
their labor.43 It follows that endorsement value—the ability of 
celebrities to license to advertisers the use of their image or 
likeness—is a protectable property interest.44 The right of 
publicity, then, clearly has economic components.45 In simplest 
form, it protects an individual’s hard work behind obtaining 
celebrity status.46 Likewise, the right prevents others from 
                                                          
37 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928-29 (6th Cir. 2003); 
Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 2001). 
38 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992). See also 
Hoffman, 255 F.3d at 1183-84. 
39 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
967 (10th Cir. 1996). 
40 Haelan Laboratories, Inc., v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 
868 (2d Cir. 1953). 
41 Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001). 
42 Id. 
43 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975. The court considers this a “noneconomic” 
justification. Id. Yet, the court also explains this right by stating that the 
celebrity must practice for years in order to gain marketable status. Id. If it is 
marketable status that the celebrity attains, it is hard to see how this is a 
noneconomic justification for the right of publicity. 
44 Id. at 974; ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 952 (6th Cir. 
2003) (Clay J., dissenting). 
45 Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 807. “[T]he right of publicity is essentially an 
economic right.” Id. 
46 ETW, 332 F.3d at 957-58 (Clay, J., dissenting) (citing Comedy III, 21 
P.3d at 802-05). 
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exploiting the good name and will that the celebrity has attained 
for him or herself.47 The right of publicity, therefore, makes it 
unlawful to misappropriate a valuable identity.48 As this aspect of 
the right is economic, the right extends to the celebrity’s heirs.49 
Another economic characteristic of the right of publicity is its 
similarity to intellectual property law.50 Intellectual property law 
generally, and trademark law specifically, grants an individual a 
civil cause of action against one who wrongfully uses a trademark 
without the owner’s permission.51 A trademark is a symbol or 
device that is adopted by the mark owner, to the exclusion of use 
by all other persons, in order to distinguish the goods or property 
made or sold by the owner.52 Just as trademark law protects the 
trademark owner’s exclusive use of the commercial identification 
                                                          
47 Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001). 
48 Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 919 (N.D. Ohio 2004). It 
would be futile for an advertiser or anyone else to appropriate an identity that 
had no value. Such appropriation would not provide the advertiser with any 
benefit. Advertisers after all, seek to gain marketability from the appropriation. 
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). 
Advertisers use celebrities to promote their products. The more popular 
the celebrity, the greater the number of people who recognize her, and 
the greater the visibility for the product. The identities of the most 
popular celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers, but 
also the easiest to evoke without resorting to obvious means such as 
name, likeness, or voice. 
Id. Therefore, the assumption here is that the identities dealt with have some 
commercial value. 
49 Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 805. 
50 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g 
Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 
447 (6th Cir. 2003); Bosley, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 920 (stating that trademark 
protection is a property right protection). 
51 Trade-Mark, 100 U.S. at 92. 
52 Id. The Court gives a brief summary of trademark rights: 
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods 
or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the 
exclusion of use by all other persons, has been long recognized by the 
common law and the chancery courts of England and of this country, 
and by the statutes of some States. 
Id. 
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of a product, the right of publicity protects the individual 
celebrity’s exclusive use of the commercial identifications of him 
or herself.53 Additionally, in the same way that misuse of a 
trademark may lead to consumer confusion about a product not 
associated with the trademark owner, the misuse of a celebrity’s 
name or image in association with a product might lead to 
consumer confusion about whether the celebrity endorsed the 
product.54 Avoiding such consumer confusion is a goal shared by 
trademark law and the right of publicity.55 
Finally, in addition to preventing mark confusion, another 
protection afforded by trademark law is the prevention of mark 
dilution.56 Dilution occurs in two situations: (1) when the value of 
the mark is degraded, which occurs when an identity is used freely, 
lessening any endorsement value it may have, or (2) when the 
value of the mark is tarnished, which occurs when an exploiter 
attaches obscene, pornographic, or base material to the image.57 In 
this way, the right of publicity is again similar to trademark law 
because it protects the endorsement value of the celebrity’s name 
or image and also protects against the tarnishing of the celebrity’s 
name or image, albeit to a lesser degree.58 
It is clear from courts’ use of the right of publicity in protecting 
privacy and property interests, as well as its similarity to trademark 
law, that the right is well-grounded in property jurisprudence and 
privacy jurisprudence. The rights associated with property and 
privacy have long been acknowledged as basic and fundamental 
rights.59 As with all rights, however, the right of publicity is not 
                                                          
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 446. 
55 Id. at 445. The goal of the Lanham Act was to avoid “confusion among 
consumers or to cause consumers to make a mistake or to deceive consumers.” 
Id. For further discussion, see text infra § I(B). 
56 Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 777 (8th Cir. 2004). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 777-78. The right of publicity concerns itself more with 
endorsement value and preventing exploitation of the fame of the celebrity, than 
with name tarnishing. See text infra IV(B)(b). 
59 U.S. CONST. amends. V and IV, respectively. 
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absolute.60 The First Amendment is an important competing and 
limiting factor on the use of the right of publicity.61 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S INTERACTION WITH THE RIGHT OF 
PUBLICITY 
Defendants in right of publicity actions often assert the First 
Amendment as an affirmative defense.62 The First Amendment 
protects certain speech from governmental regulation.63 There are 
various levels of First Amendment protection and courts have 
taken degree-oriented approaches. For instance, newscasts on 
matters of public interest enjoy a very high degree of protection.64 
Expressive materials sold for profit also retain some First 
Amendment protection,65 but enjoy a lower level of protection 
because the danger of consumer deception warrants some 
governmental regulation.66 Books and movies have a high level of 
protection because they are vehicles through which ideas and 
opinions are disseminated;67 less so for posters and other forms of 
merchandise having a commercial interest.68 
A. Free Speech Protection & its Limitations 
First Amendment protection is far reaching but is limited by 
certain public interests.69 The Supreme Court found the 
                                                          
60 See text infra § II. 
61 Id. 
62 Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001). See 
Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 477-78 (Cal. 2003). 
63 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
968 (10th Cir. 1996). Application of statute or common law by a court satisfies 
this state action requirement. Id. 
64 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., 433 U.S. 562, 567 (1977). 
65 City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755-56 n.5 
(1988). 
66 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997 (2d Cir. 1989). 
67 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003); Hicks v. 
Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
68 Parks, 329 F.3d at 449; Hicks, 464 F. Supp. at 430. 
69 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
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distribution of pamphlets,70 circulation of handbills,71 display of 
yard signs,72 flag burning,73 nude dancing,74 and jackets bearing 
profanity75 all to be protected by the First Amendment. 
Entertaining speech, like informative speech, is protected.76 Art 
does not even need a message in order to be protected.77 
Nevertheless, there are limitations to the right. Legitimate and 
actual expression receives the highest degree of First Amendment 
protection.78 However, the degree of protection decreases when the 
primary goal of the work is to market or sell the work or another 
item.79 Works with minimal expression which primarily try to sell 
another product, such as advertisements, have the least First 
                                                          
969 (10th Cir. 1996). “This case instead requires us to directly balance the 
magnitude of the speech restriction against the asserted governmental interest in 
protecting the intellectual property right. We thus begin our analysis by 
examining the importance of Cardtoons’ right to free expression and the 
consequences of limiting that right.” Id. at 972. See also Smith v. Daily Mail 
Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“Historically, we 
have viewed freedom of speech and of the press as indispensable to a free 
society and its government. But recognition of this proposition has not meant 
that the public interest in free speech and press always has prevailed over 
competing interests of the public.”). 
70 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938). 
71 Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943). 
72 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
73 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
74 Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981). 
75 Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15, 29 (1971). 
76 Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
969 (10th Cir. 1996).  
77 Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001). 
78 See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 452 (6th Cir. 2003). 
79 See id. at 454. In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc., the court states that 
when there is First Amendment protection, there is no need to even check for 
consumer confusion or deception. 332 F.3d 915, 926 (6th Cir. 2003). “[W]e 
conclude that where the defendant has articulated a colorable claim that the use 
of celebrity’s identity is protected by the First Amendment, the likelihood of 
confusion test is not appropriate because it fails to adequately consider the 
interests protected by the First Amendment.” Id. (emphasis added). This is bad 
law. Even if there is a valid and ‘colorable’ First Amendment claim, the court 
still needs to see if there is consumer confusion. If there is confusion, then the 
First Amendment protection will be diminished. See text infra § II(B). 
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Amendment protection.80 For commercial messages and 
advertisements, the First Amendment yields to the greater public 
interest in truthful and accurate commercial speech.81 Thus, the 
fact that there is a message conveyed by a work does not mean that 
the message will be protected by the First Amendment.82 
The First Amendment also yields to copyright and trademark 
law.83 Copyright and trademark law protects authors and creators 
of works from infringement by others.84 These laws prevent people 
from creating works which are confusingly similar to those of 
another.85 In preventing people from making infringing works, the 
infringer’s First Amendment right to free speech must again yield 
to the greater public interest in allowing creators to retain 
ownership of their innovations.86 
B. Commercial Speech Is More Vulnerable to Regulation 
As mentioned above, commercial speech is afforded less First 
Amendment protection than artistic or informational speech.87 
Although the boundary between commercial and noncommercial 
speech has yet to be clearly defined, at its core, commercial speech 
                                                          
80 Parks, 329 F.3d at 447. The First Amendment only protects the 
expressive elements in a work. It does not protect any part of a work that is not 
expressive. Incidentally, if there are enough expressive elements in a work, the 
whole work will be under First Amendment protection. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 
810. 
81 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
82 Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 787 (8th Cir. 2004). 
83 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. 
Supp. 366, 375 (D.C.N.Y. 1979). “It has long been settled in our jurisprudence 
that rights of free expression, embodied in the First Amendment and other legal 
doctrines, are subject to rights under the copyright and trademark laws.” Id. 
84 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989). A trademark is 
infringed upon when an exploiter uses the trademark without permission. Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. It would be inimical to the protections of the First Amendment if the 
law did not recognize the right of creators to protect their creative work against 
infringement by other creators. Id. 
87 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 498 (1996). 
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aims to facilitate commercial transactions by attracting consumers 
to a product or service.88 The Supreme Court has determined, 
therefore, that commercial speech will not be as highly protected 
as other types of expression, such as newscasts, political 
commentary, or art.89 
Many right of publicity cases revolve around commercial 
speech which uses the identity of a celebrity without permission.90 
Examples include the use of a baseball player’s image in a printed 
beer advertisement,91 the use of a basketball star’s former name in 
a television car commercial,92 the imitation of a singer’s voice in a 
                                                          
88 Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983). 
89 Id.; Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 
2001). In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), the United States Supreme Court established a four-
part test to determine if commercial speech can be governmentally regulated: 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected 
by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within the 
provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is 
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine 
whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve 
that interest. 
Id. 
90 Hoffman, 225 F.3d at 1185. 
91 Newcombe v. Adolph Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998). 
Plaintiff Newcombe was an all-star Major League Baseball player. Id. at 689. 
He was one of the first African-American ballplayers in Major League Baseball. 
Id. Coors Brewing Co. published an advertisement which featured a drawing of 
an old-time baseball game. Id. The drawing featured a pitcher in the windup 
position which was immediately recognizable as Newcombe. Id. 
92 Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 (9th Cir. 1996). 
Famed basketball player Kareem Abdul-Jabbar’s birth name was Ferdinand 
Lewis (“Lew”) Alcindor. Id. While he used the name Abdul-Jabbar for 
endorsement purposes, he never used his former name Alcindor. Id. A car 
commercial, by defendant, featured the quote “Who holds the record for being 
voted the most outstanding player of this tournament?” Id. Then the printed 
words, “Lew Alcindor, UCLA, ‘67, ‘68, ‘69” appeared on the screen. Id. 
Afterwards, the voiceover talks about the attributes of the Oldsmobile Eighty-
Eight. Id. 
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radio snack-food advertisement,93 the use of a game-show hostess’ 
identity in a printed advertisement selling VCRs,94 and the sound-
alike rendition of a song that a popular singer recorded.95 In cases 
such as these, the celebrity’s identity is used entirely for the 
purposes of selling a product.96 The commercial aspects are 
“inextricably entwined” with the expressive elements, which the 
Court has found to be minimal.97 Our society has a market for the 
exploitation of celebrities in order to sell products.98 Such 
exploitation is “an attempt to take a free ride on a celebrity’s 
celebrity value.”99 In order for the marketing message to be 
effective, the advertisement must clearly evoke the celebrity’s 
identity.100 After all, if consumers do not realize that the celebrity 
is associated with the product, the advertiser does not benefit from 
                                                          
93 Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1992). Waits 
was a renowned singer, songwriter, and actor with a distinctive voice. Id. at 
1097. He achieved both critical and commercial success in his career. Id. Frito-
Lay, Inc. produced packaged chips. Id. In introducing a new product, the chip 
company used one of Waits’ songs in a commercial. Id. The company also used 
an imitator that sounded like Waits and “captured” his style. Id. 
94 White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992). 
Plaintiff White was the hostess of a popular game show with over forty-million 
viewers daily. Id. In an advertising campaign, defendant used a robot which was 
dressed and formed to resemble the famous hostess. Id. The robot had on a wig, 
gown, and jewelry all modeled after the hostess. Id. The caption of the 
advertisement read: Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D. Id. 
95 Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988). Midler was 
a very popular and acclaimed actress and singer. Id. Defendant produced a 
commercial that featured one of Midler’s songs. Id. After Midler turned down 
the advertising company’s request to perform on the commercial, the advertising 
company found another singer that “sounded exactly” like Midler. Id. While 
neither a picture nor image of Midler was used in the commercial, the 
commercial did feature the sound-alike singer singing one of Midler’s songs. Id. 
96 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
97 Id. The Hoffman court found this to be true in all of the previous 
examples. Id. 
98 White, 971 F.2d at 1401 n.3. 
99 Id. This is, if there is misappropriation. Id. 
100 Id. At least clear enough to the point of recognition. Id. 
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exploiting the identity.101 Such an attempt to take a free ride at the 
celebrity’s expense is impermissible under intellectual property 
law.102 
In general, courts have held that when an identity is exploited 
in order to sell products which consist of the identity itself, such as 
baseball cards, it is not considered commercial speech.103 Parodies 
are a prime example, which are considered creative expression and 
not commercial speech.104 They necessarily rely on evoking the 
image of the target celebrity.105 Additionally, putting a literal 
                                                          
101 Id. “The more effective the evocation [of the identity], the better the 
advertisement.” Id. If the ad is generic, then the ad would not violate the right of 
publicity, but it would also not be all that effective. Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
976 (10th Cir. 1996). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 972. Parodies have an important place in our society. Id. “A 
parodist, with deft and wit, can readily expose the foolish and absurd in society.” 
Id. A parody is also a valuable form of self-expression. Id. It allows an artist to 
shed light on earlier works and, at the same time, create new ones. Id. As a 
means of social criticism and a means of self-expression, parodies are a vital 
commodity in the marketplace of ideas. Id. 
 “Parodies of celebrities are an especially valuable means of expression 
because of the role celebrities play in modern society.” Id. A celebrity is a 
common point of reference for millions of individuals that share nothing else. Id. 
They may never have interacted with each other, but they share the knowledge 
of this celebrity. Id. Celebrities have come to symbolize many ideas through 
their pervasive presence in the media. Id. “Celebrities then, are an important 
element of the shared communicative resources of our cultural domain.” Id. A 
parody of a celebrity does more than just lampoon that celebrity. It exposes the 
weakness of the idea or value that that particular celebrity symbolizes in society. 
Id. Thus, restricting the use of the celebrity in a parody restricts the 
communication of ideas. Id. 
 Additionally, no endorsement value is diminished by the use of a celebrity 
identity in a parody. Id. at 975. Celebrities do not want to endorse their own 
criticism. If given the power to restrict the use of their identities for parodies, 
they would censor, not endorse. That is, they would not sell their rights to 
parodists. Id. They would, instead, bar the allowance of artists to parody them. 
Id. Therefore, this power will turn into one of censorship, not protection. Id. For 
the foregoing reasons, parodies receive extra protection. Id. at 976. 
 Additional insight into parody can be gained from Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. 
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depiction of a likeness on T-shirts may not constitute commercial 
speech and would be afforded First Amendment protection if the 
image were used expressively.106 Yet, if that likeness on the T-shirt 
were used to market another product, such as a soft-drink, it would 
likely be considered commercial speech and would not be afforded 
First Amendment protection. The right of publicity prevents the 
image from exploitation in such circumstances by making the 
                                                          
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Groups, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989). The 
plaintiff in that case was the producer of summaries on literary classics. Id. at 
491. These summaries are widely used amongst students of all levels. Id. The 
defendant created a three book series called Spy Notes. Id. at 492. It was a one-
time parody of the famous Cliffs Notes. Id. Inside the books were humorous 
content instead of serious comment. Id. However, the main issue was the cover 
of the books. Id. Spy Notes copied every prominent feature of the cover of Cliffs 
Notes. Id. However, there were some differences. The cover of Spy Notes 
prominently stated five times in red lettering that it was a satire and bore the 
notation “A Spy Book” along with the Spy Magazine logo. It also showed a clay 
sculpture of New York City rather than the famous clay sculpture of a mountain 
that is found on the cover of Cliffs Notes. Id. In light of these changes, and the 
defendant’s expressive elements in the form of parody, the court found for the 
defendants. Id. at 497. 
 In its ruling, the court stated that “parody is a form of artistic expression, 
protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 493. Parody protection is so strong 
that no recovery, under any cause of action, will be rewarded for injury caused 
by parody, unless actual malice can be shown. Id. Thus, parody and satire 
deserve substantial freedom. Id. That is both “as entertainment and as a form of 
social and literary criticism.” Id. (quoting Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 
F.2d 541, 545 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964)). 
 The keystone of parody is imitation. Id. at 494. For a parody to be 
successful it must evoke the major elements of its target. Id. “A parody must 
convey two simultaneous—and contradictory—messages: that it is the original, 
but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody.” Id. (emphasis in 
original). To the extent that it only conveys that it is the original, without 
conveying any parody, it not only is a poor parody, but will be vulnerable to 
trademark law. Id. This is, because it confuses the consumer. Id. The better the 
parody the less likely it is to cause confusion. Id. at 495. Alternatively, the 
poorer the parody, the more likely it will be  to cause consumer confusion. Id. 
Therefore, parodies done well will receive protection, while poor parodies will 
be vulnerable to intellectual property law. Id. 
106 Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 (Cal. 2001). In 
Comedy III, the literal depiction was of The Three Stooges, a famed comedy 
group. Id. at 801. 
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misappropriation unlawful.107 
Commercial speech retains significantly less First Amendment 
protection than other speech in general because its main purpose is 
to sell, not to be creative.108 Furthermore, commercial speech that 
is misleading will not be afforded any First Amendment 
protection.109 Speech that is a mixture of commercial promotion 
and creative expression has only limited protection.110 It is likely in 
these instances that the right of publicity will protect the image.111 
The First Amendment will comport with the limitations imposed 
by the right of publicity.112 Therefore, even if commercial speech 
                                                          
107 Id. 
108 Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
109 Id. at 925. “For example, the First Amendment does not shield from 
liability commercial messages which contain misleading material or relate to 
illegal activity.” Id. 
110 Id. at 929. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. In Bosley, the district court enjoined the defendant from selling 
images of the plaintiff, a regional celebrity, and from using her images to sell its 
product. Id. at 936. Plaintiff was a local television news broadcaster, and 
defendant was the distributor of a pornographic website. Id. The use of the 
images did not involve any creative expression. Id. This case, however, is 
pending appeal. Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11028, *1 (6th 
Cir. 2004). Upon granting a stay to the injunction pending appeal, the circuit 
court stated that the “present case ‘illustrates the difficulty of drawing bright 
lines that will clearly cabin commercial speech in a distinct category.’” Id. at *2. 
Further, the court stated that it was “not persuaded, at th[at] stage in the 
proceedings, that the defendant’s speech [wa]s outside the protection of the First 
Amendment.” Id. It remains to be seen how the law will change, at least in the 
6th Circuit. Based on the court’s language in the stay, it is reasonable to suspect 
that the court will find for defendant on appeal. 
 In a recent case, the Sixth Circuit found for a defendant that used the image 
and likeness of a professional golfer in a lithograph. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g 
Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 2003). Over five thousand reprints of the 
lithograph were sold. Id. The court found that since the collage of images 
depicted was combined to describe a historic event, the work was artistic. Id. 
Therefore, the court found that the First Amendment protected the work. Id. In 
other words, the court went so far to diminish the right of publicity, that it found 
that First Amendment protection extends to literal depictions that are meant for 
sale. It is very likely, then, that the same court will find that the First 
Amendment also protects purely commercial speech; i.e., speech for the sole 
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is also creative, it will not necessarily be granted First Amendment 
protection if the purpose of the speech is primarily commercial.113 
III.  THE NEED FOR A NEW TEST 
A. The Unbalanced Approach Taken by the Courts 
Surprisingly, few courts have tried to reconcile the right of 
publicity with the First Amendment.114 Instead, courts just seem to 
grapple blindly with the right.115 Some try their own balancing but 
end up severely minimizing the right.116 Others arrive at the correct 
outcome but for uncertain reasons.117 Unfortunately, such 
uncertainty has resulted in confusion on how to litigate cases 
involving the rights of publicity, and has even resulted in injustice 
in some cases.118 
For example, in Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball 
Players Association, the plaintiff baseball card company produced 
a series of parody cards lampooning various players in Major 
League Baseball.119 In this declaratory judgment, defendant Major 
League Baseball Player’s Association argued that the card 
company’s unauthorized use of players’ likenesses diminished the 
players’ licensing value, which generated over seventy percent of 
their revenue.120 In discussing the rights of the parties, the Tenth 
                                                          
purpose of exploiting the identity of the celebrity in order to market a product. 
This would, indeed, be a mistake. It would all but do away with the right of 
publicity. 
113 Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 787 (8th Cir. 2004). 
114 Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001). 
115 See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 
F.3d 959, 959-76 (10th Cir. 1996). See also infra this section. 
116 ETW, 332 F.3d at 949 (Clay, J., dissenting). See also infra this section. 
117 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1189 
(9th Cir. 2001). See also infra this section. 
118 See, e.g., Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th 
Cir. 2004). See also infra this section. 
119 95 F.3d at 962. This case was a declaratory judgment not a lawsuit for 
damages. Id. 
120 Id. at 963. 
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Circuit put forth many justifications for upholding the right of 
publicity.121 However, the court curtly changed gears and granted 
plaintiff’s petition for a declaratory judgment that plaintiff’s cards 
did not infringe on the defendant’s publicity rights, after building 
an extensive case for the defendant because plaintiff’s use of the 
players’ likenesses did not diminish defendant’s endorsement 
value.122 The court noted that the right of publicity reserves the 
value of the identity to “advertisers who contract for the use of 
[the] likeness.”123 Yet, the court also stated that “even in the 
absence of publicity rights, celebrities would still be able to reap 
financial reward from authorizing appearances and 
endorsements.”124 The court’s statements are contradictory, 
because it first stated that endorsement value is preserved by 
publicity rights, but then stated that endorsement value will thrive 
regardless of publicity rights.125 The court acknowledged that “the 
right of publicity is said to protect various noneconomic interests, 
such as safeguarding natural rights, securing the fruits of celebrity 
labors, preventing unjust enrichment, and averting emotional 
harm.”126 However, the court ultimately found all of these 
justifications non-compelling and decided the case in favor of the 
plaintiff.127 Instead of applying a clear standard to the rights, the 
court struggled to find (and ultimately found) justification for 
using a celebrity’s identity for parody.128 
                                                          
121 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
967-76 (10th Cir. 1996). The court listed economic and noneconmic 
justification. Id. at 973. The right’s economic goals include “stimulating athletic 
and artistic achievement, promoting the efficient allocation of resources, and 
protecting consumers.” Id. The right’s non-economic goals include 
“safeguarding natural rights, securing the fruits of celebrity labors, preventing 
unjust enrichment, and averting emotional harm.” Id. 
122 Id. at 975-76. 
123 Id. at 974-75. This is endorsement value. See id. at 975. 
124 Id. at 974. 
125 Id. at 974-75. 
126 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 973. 
127 Id. at 976. 
128 The court was mainly protecting the public interest in parodies. Id. at 
972. Still, the fact that the case was about a parody seems to get lost in the 
shuffle. Instead of focusing on this, the court stumbles its way through the 
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ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing Inc. is a case which illustrates 
how a bad balancing test can almost neutralize the right of 
publicity.  In ETW Corp., the defendant artist used the likeness of a 
famous golfer in a drawing.129 This drawing contained three exact 
likenesses of the golfer.130 Over five thousand prints of the 
drawing were put on the market.131 The golfer sued for the 
exploitation of his image.132 In its lengthy discussion, the court 
adopted the “transformative elements test” for guidance.133 Even 
though the court agreed that the depictions were a “literal 
likeness,” it still refused to find for the plaintiff because it found 
transformative elements in the fact that the drawing contained 
more than one literal likeness.134 In a confusing manner, the court 
stated that using a single literal depiction is not allowed, but using 
a collage of images is permissible, because a collage of images 
apparently has more expressive elements.135 This holding allows 
                                                          
policy considerations of the right of publicity. Id. at 973-76. 
129 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003). The 
golfer was Tiger Woods. Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 935. The court stated that “the transformative elements test 
adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Comedy III Productions, will 
assist us in determining where the proper balance lies between the First 
Amendment and Woods’s intellectual property rights.” Id. at 936. See also text 
supra § IV(A). 
 The transformative elements test determines how directly the work at issue 
has used the celebrity’s identity. Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 
808 (Cal. 2001). If the work has just adopted a literal depiction of the identity, 
then the work will be vulnerable to right of publicity protection. Id. If, however, 
the work changed or added some elements to the identity, the work will be 
afforded First Amendment protection. Id. See text infra § III(B) for further 
explanation. 
134 ETW, 332 F.3d at 938. 
135 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 938 (6th Cir. 2003). 
“Rush’s work does not capitalize solely on a literal depiction of Woods. Rather, 
Rush’s work consists of a collage of images in addition to Woods’s image.” Id. 
(emphasis added). The court reasoned that the multiple images created an 
expressive element. Id. That is, it captured a moment in sports history. Id. This, 
however, is a grave misconstruction. Id. at 959 (Clay, J., dissenting). The images 
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imitators to exploit likenesses so long as more than one image is 
used in a single work. In sum, the majority misapplies the law of 
publicity.136 
                                                          
used in the drawing are nearly identical to those used in authorized Nike posters. 
Id. The majority errs in not protecting the rights of the plaintiff. Id. at 960. “The 
Majority’s failure to do so in this case is in complete contravention to the intent 
of Congress, the principles of trademark law, and the well-established body of 
jurisprudence in this area.” Id. 
136 Id. at 948 (Clay, J., dissenting). The court in ETW seems to suggest that 
having an actual depiction with a clever title will protect the work from publicity 
liability. Id. at 938. “While the right of publicity allows celebrities . . . to enjoy 
the fruits of their labors, here [the artist] has added a significant creative 
component of his own to [the celebrity’s] identity,” the title of the work. Id. 
When there is a collage of images together, suggesting a moment in sports 
history, the use of the literal depictions will be protected. Id. All the more so 
when the work has an artistic title. Id. at 919. Bosley v. Wildwett.com explained 
the holding in ETW. 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 927 (N.D. Ohio 2004). The court 
explained that ETW did not directly address the role of the First Amendment in 
advertising cases. Id. It was only speaking about an artistic work. Id. Note, 
however, that this artistic work was trying to sell itself. ETW, 332 F.3d at 919. It 
was not merely a single print, but over five thousand were put on the market. Id. 
It is uncertain, then, that in a case where a product designer appropriates an 
image, and uses it on the product itself, and not in advertising, whether ETW 
would not control. 
 ETW should be overturned. The facts of the case do not pass the new test. 
The artist used a collage of likenesses in a work of art. Id. at 918. The art was 
reprinted over five thousand times, and put on the market for sale. Id. at 919. 
The collage featured literal depictions of Tiger Woods, a superstar golfer, in his 
signature poses. Id. at 918. In the accompanying literature, Woods’s name is 
mentioned twice. Id. at 919.  
 Applying the factors of the test is not difficult in this case. The work has a 
dual purpose. As it does seek to capture a moment in time, it is also focusing on 
the celebrity Tiger Woods. The main purpose of the art is to capitalize off of the 
fame that Tiger Woods worked hard to attain. The event depicts the day he 
became the youngest player in sports history to win the Masters tournament. Id. 
at 918. He also created a new 72-hole record in the tournament. Id. He has risen 
to the pinnacle of his sport. Id. The artist is capitalizing off of this success. 
Painting literal depictions is not any more expressive than putting together a 
collage of photographs. The purpose is the same, to take advantage of another’s 
fame for personal gain. True, the artist claims to commemorate an event, but he 
is also exploiting an image. 
 This type of product leads to confusion and dilution. Such a 
commemorative work will likely be seen by consumers as affiliated in some way 
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On the other hand, the case of Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC 
Inc. is an example where the Ninth Circuit arrived at the correct 
ruling, but for the wrong reasons.137 Plaintiff actor Dustin Hoffman 
starred in “Tootsie,” a movie in which he played a male actor who 
dresses like a woman in order to get a part on a television soap 
opera.138 A memorable still from the movie depicts the actor 
dressed in a red long-sleeved sequined evening dress, posing in 
front of an American flag.139 The defendant magazine publisher 
published an article which contained altered photographs of 
famous movies to make it appear that the actors were sporting the 
current fall fashion.140 The final shot in the article was of the 
memorable “Tootsie” still, altered by replacing the actor’s body 
with that of a male model in the same pose, wearing a spaghetti-
strapped, cream-colored, silk evening dress.141 The actor sued, 
claiming that the magazine was tortuously exploiting his 
identity.142 The court reasoned that using an identity for 
commercial purposes is beyond the scope of First Amendment 
protection.143 However, the court found that the altered photo was 
not used to sell the fall line, just to present the trick photography, 
instead of stating that there were expressive elements in the 
work.144 Thus, the correct holding—that the magazine can use the 
                                                          
to the player. The poses shown, after all, are identical to the ones used in Nike 
posters that are endorsed by the celebrity. Id. at 947 (Clay, J., dissenting). Aside 
from confusion, there is also dilution. Tiger Woods would want to sell the rights 
to such a project. Especially since it is commemorative, it views him in the 
greatest light possible. Therefore, there is a great likelihood of confusion and 
dilution. 
 Summary judgment should have been awarded to Woods. 
137 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). 
138 Id. at 1182. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. at 1183. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1185 (9th Cir. 
2001). “If the altered photograph had appeared in a Ralph Lauren advertisement, 
then we would be facing” a different kind of case, one where the right of 
publicity will be upheld. Id. 
144 Id. Therefore, it could be argued that the photograph had a clear 
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image—was arrived at, but with the wrong analysis—due to lack 
of commercial purposes, rather than being clear that it was the 
expressive elements in the work.145 Results of this kind are 
dangerous for they may lead to more confusion in the case law. 
The case of Donchez v. Coors Brewing Company is an example 
of injustice as a result of failure to appreciate the need to protect 
publicity rights.146 Plaintiff in the case was the first beer vendor to 
be licensed for the Colorado Rockies. While working as a beer 
vendor he created his own distinct character,147 calling himself 
“Bob the Beerman.”148 Plaintiff even went so far as to file the 
“Bob the Beerman” character for state trademark protection.149 He 
then worked as this character in various sporting events in and out 
of Colorado.150 He also performed on television and radio, and at 
charitable events.151 During this time, he authored a book and 
starred in a video as his character.152 Defendant beer company, 
hearing about this character, pursued negotiations with the plaintiff 
to use the character in an ad campaign.153 However, the beer 
company ultimately declined to enter into any contractual 
relationship with the plaintiff.154 
Following this unsuccessful pursuit, the beer company began a 
national television advertising campaign utilizing many different 
                                                          
expressive purpose. Id. 
145 It is clear that the purpose of the magazine was (1) to parody the 
movies, and (2) to illustrate the ability to alter photographs. Id. Therefore, the 
article should be protected as speech and not because of a lack of actual malice. 
146 392 F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2004). 
147 Id. at 1214. 
148 Id. Plaintiff would call out to the crowd “My favorite word in the 
English language: Beer! Two favorite words: Cold Beer! Three favorite words: 
Cold Beer Man!” Id. He would use beer, peanuts and Cracker Jacks as props. Id. 
He would put on this act in order to entertain the crowd. Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. No reasons are stated in this case. It can be presumed, however, that 
money was the deciding factor. The beer company, perhaps, did not want to pay 
for a character they could exploit for free. See text infra this section. 
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actors and actresses portraying beer vendors.155 The beer vendors 
would interact with the crowd in entertaining ways and were 
referred to, by the crowd and themselves, as “Beerman.” 156 Many 
who knew the plaintiff or had seen his act commented that they 
thought he had licensed his character to the beer company.157 
Plaintiff then filed suit in order to protect the character he 
created.158 
Claiming to balance the rights of the parties, the court instead 
summarily favored the defendant. The court claimed to “view the 
evidence, and draw reasonable inferences therefrom.”159 Even so, 
the court found for defendant.160 It stated that the mark “Bob the 
Beerman” was too generic, and did not acquire secondary 
meaning.161 “Secondary meaning” is a meaning in the minds of the 
public other than the plain meaning of the words.162 The court 
noted, as well, that the defendant never used “Bob the Beerman,” 
but simply “Beerman.”163 As for the right of publicity, the court 
                                                          
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 1214-15. The facts do not note whether the beer vendors looked 
like the plaintiff. However, this does not seem likely. There were many actors 
that played the part. Additionally, there were actresses.  
157 Id. at 1214. This was based on a survey gathered by the Plaintiff. Id. 
158 Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2004). 
159 Id. at 1215. 
160 Id. at 1223. 
161 Id. at 1217. 
162 Id. at 1216. An example is Seven-Up. Id. at 1218. When hearing these 
words combined in such a way, it is automatically assumed that the speaker 
refers to the soft drink, not the number seven going up. Id. The term “beerman” 
however, did not attain such secondary meaning. Id. It was thought of as a man 
that has beer. Id. This is the plain meaning. Id. 
163 Id. at 1217. The court seemed to rest its decision on the fact that the 
plaintiff failed to present much evidence. Id. While he did have evidence that the 
term “Beerman” was identifiable to himself, he failed to present it on appeal. Id. 
“For whatever reason, however, Donchez has not included that report in his 
appellate appendix.” Id. Thus, the court knew of the evidence, and yet still 
ignored it. Id. “Thus, we cannot consider the report and the statements included 
therein in determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
the classification of the term ‘beerman.’” Id. This is even though the court will 
incidentally be leaving the plaintiff without any evidence on the matter. Id. “In 
turn, that leaves Donchez without any evidence to support his assertion that the 
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dismissed that inquiry by stating that “the Colorado Supreme Court 
does not appear to have expressly recognized this tort.”164 Thus, 
the court concluded that the plaintiff did not sufficiently present 
evidence that he had a protectable interest in his mark 
“Beerman.”165 In this case, the court ignored the fact that the 
plaintiff took the initiative to have his character protected in the 
state patent office,166 that he was recognizable as the character,167 
that he used the character for capital gain,168 and that the beer 
company only ran the advertising campaign after meeting with 
him.169 Instead of protecting creativity, the court allowed free 
misappropriation of the created persona.170 Furthermore, the court 
also failed to protect consumers from confusion.171 Consumers 
may erroneously believe that Donchez endorsed the beer 
commercials or that the character was created by the beer 
company. In sum, instead of protecting ideas, publicity, trademark, 
and consumer interests, the court opened the door for further 
                                                          
term ‘beerman’ is suggestive.” Id. Instead of considering this evidence, perhaps 
not in the opinion, but as policy, the court utterly ignores it. Id. 
 Further, the plaintiff had evidence that his character was so prevalent, that 
there were many who only knew him by his character name. Id. at 1219. The 
court, again, refused to acknowledge this evidence. Id. “Donchez has not, 
however, included any of those deposition excerpts in his appendix.” Id. Even 
though the court knew of the evidence, and it was presented at trial, it refused to 
consider it on appeal. Id. 
164 Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1220 (10th Cir. 2004). 
What about the common law right of publicity? Landham v. Galoob Toys, Inc., 
227 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2000). The Donchez court utterly disregards the 
clearly established federal common law right of publicity. See id. 
165 Donchez, 392 F.3d. at 1219. “In turn, we conclude he has failed to 
present sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find he has a protectable interest in 
the mark ‘beerman.’” Id. 
166 Id. at 1214. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. The implication here is that the beer company wanted the use of the 
character for free. After negotiations for buying the license to use the character 
stalled, the beer company used the character without paying any licensing fees. 
170 Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004). 
171 Id. at 1214. 
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misappropriation.172 
The court struck down the right of publicity claim because 
“Donchez has not presented any evidence to establish that he, as 
opposed to the character he created, is a celebrity.”173 This is 
clearly faulty reasoning, in light of the fact that the court admits 
that the created persona did become a celebrity.174 Therefore, it is 
clear from Donchez and the previous cases that without the proper 
guidance, publicity rights are in danger of being invaded by 
individuals and corporations looking to exploit the images of 
individuals who have already cultivated a market. Presently, courts 
lack the proper guidance to adjudicate matters in which publicity 
rights have been invaded by free-riders. 
B. Courts Lack Proper Guidance 
A uniform test is needed mainly because different courts have 
adopted different tests, leading to inconsistency in the law of 
publicity. The following subsections will highlight some of those 
tests, along with their shortcomings. 
1. The Transformative Elements Test 
In Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. the Supreme 
Court of California established the “transformative elements” 
test.175 “The inquiry into whether a work is ‘transformative’ 
appears to us to be necessarily at the heart of any judicial attempt 
to square the right of publicity with the First Amendment.”176 
                                                          
172 What follows from this holding, is that now, if an advertiser wants to 
use a creative character invented by someone else, the advertiser need only to 
slightly alter the character and make it generic. Additionally, now that Coors 
created the generic “beerman” character, it might be able to succeed, under the 
court’s logic, on an action to prevent Donchez from using his “Bob the 
Beerman” character. The company would, theoretically, be successful in a 
trademark claim against Donchez. This is not justice. 
173 Id. at 1221. 
174 Id. 
175 Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 2001). 
176 Id. 
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When a work that contains a celebrity’s identity has “significant 
transformative elements” it will be afforded more protection.177 A 
work with such changes is afforded more First Amendment 
protection because it is less likely to interfere with the economic 
interests protected by the right of publicity.178 Transformative 
elements are found by inquiring into where the work derives its 
value from.179 When the principal value of the work comes from 
the creativity, skill, and reputation of the artist, and not from the 
fame of the celebrity, then it may be presumed to contain sufficient 
transformative elements to warrant First Amendment protection.180 
However, literal depiction of a celebrity, even if done with great 
skill and talent, will be vulnerable to the right of publicity.181 The 
inquiry is whether it is literal and imitative or creative elements 
that predominate in the work.182 The “expression” in the work 
must be something other than the likeness of the celebrity.183 
The transformative elements test was adopted in Winter v. DC 
Comics.184 As the California Supreme Court explains the test, its 
limitations become apparent.185 The test protects against 
trespassing on the commercial value of the celebrity.186 
Commercial value, however, is the limit of the protection. The 
                                                          
177 Id. (emphasis added). 
178 Id. The more changes a work has the less likely it is to cause consumer 
confusion and dilution. See text infra § IV(B)(b). 
179 Id. at 810. 
180 Id. 
181 Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001). 
Ironically, it is works created with less skill that may be protected. The more 
skill exhibited in the work, the more likely it is to cause consumer confusion and 
dilution if appropriated. This is because artistic works with great skill will look 
like a literal depiction. The less skill used in creating the work, the less the work 
will literally depict the celebrity. The work will be less likely to cause confusion 
and dilution. This is because the work will resemble the celebrity but not be a 
literal depiction. Thus, works created with less skill have a greater chance of 
being protected. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. See infra note 287 for the facts of this case. 
184 69 P.3d 473, 477 (Cal. 2003). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
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court stresses that works containing transformative elements are 
“less likely to interfere with the economic interest” of the 
celebrity.187 Further, in applying the test to the facts in front of it, 
the court stated that a comic book that uses the likenesses of 
celebrities, but turns them into fantastic characters, will not be 
infringing on the celebrities’ right of publicity.188 This is because 
fans will not consider the comic book a good substitute for the 
actual image of the celebrities.189 This test falls short of protecting 
the right of publicity because although the economic interest of 
image value is protected, it still leaves endorsement value 
vulnerable, as well as the privacy interests that the right of 
publicity protects. It also does not protect at all against consumer 
confusion as to affiliation. Therefore, this test is ineffective at 
protecting the totality of the right of publicity. 
2. The Rogers Balancing Test 
In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit suggested another 
balancing test.190 Generally, under the Rogers test, the right of 
publicity is “construed to apply to artistic works only where the 
public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the 
                                                          
187 Id. (emphasis added). 
188 Id. at 479. This case dealt with a comic book that used the images of 
two musicians in creating fantastic worm-like characters. Id. Although the 
musicians were readily recognizable in the comic book, their names were 
changed and they were transformed into worm-like antiheroes. Id. 
189 Id. at 470. But celebrities may want to endorse a comic book that uses 
their personas as heroes. The court misses this point. 
190 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). Celebrity Ginger Rogers sued the 
producers and distributors of a motion picture alleging that the title of their film 
contained her name in it in violation of the rights of publicity. Id. at 996.  Rogers 
teamed up frequently with the late Fred Astaire. Id. The two made a very famous 
dance duo. Id. Together they starred in many films. Id. They “established 
themselves as paragons of style, elegance, and grace.” Id. They are of the few 
elite of the entertainment world whose identities are readily called to mind by 
just their first names. Id. The defendant created a film entitled “Ginger and 
Fred.” Id. It was about two fictional Italian dancers that imitated Rogers and 
Astaire. Id. at 996-97. The court allowed the use of the duo’s names to be used 
in the title of the film, because the title had minimal artistic relevance to the film 
and did not explicitly mislead as to sponsorship. Id. at 1005. 
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public interest in free expression.”191 The court reasoned that a 
misleading use of an identity that has no artistic relevance cannot 
be sufficiently justified by a free expression interest.192 Expressive 
works that are sold in the commercial marketplace have a dual 
interest.193 While the expressive aspects need protection, there is 
legitimate governmental interest to regulate in order to prevent 
consumer confusion.194 Therefore, the interests are balanced to 
determine which one outweighs the other.195 
The Rogers balancing test has been widely adopted.196 Parks v. 
LaFace Records197 explained that Rogers is a two prong test.198 
The first inquiry is whether the use of the identity has artistic 
relevance to the underlying work.199 If it has no relevance then the 
inquiry ends and the right of publicity is upheld.200 If there is some 
artistic relevance, then the second inquiry is if the use “explicitly 
misleads as to the source of the content;” if so, then the right of 
publicity is also upheld.201 Barring these two outcomes, the First 
Amendment will protect the work.202 
However, this test also comes up short in protecting the right of 
publicity. The test concerns itself mainly with balancing the 
                                                          
191 Id. at 999. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 998. 
194 Id. 
195 Id. at 999.  
196 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 927 (6th Cir 2003); 
Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 450 (6th Cir. 2003). 
197 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003). 
198 Id. at 451. 
199 Id. at 452. “Artistic relevance” is found when there is any artistic 
relationship between the identity and the underlying work. Id. 
200 Id. When an artist claims that the identity is used as a “symbol” for the 
work, but upon examination the claim is deemed questionable, “a legitimate 
question is presented as to whether the artist’s claim is sincere or merely a guise 
to escape liability.” Id. at 454. 
201 Id. at 451 (emphasis added). “Explicitly misleading” is when the work 
goes out of its way to convey a false connection between the celebrity and the 
work. Id. at 459. 
202 Id. at 451. 
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interests behind the right of publicity and First Amendment.203 
However, it gives virtually no guidance on how to determine what 
the interests are. Additionally, its inquiries only seem to delve into 
the confusion issue. It does not inquire, at all, into whether there is 
any endorsement exploitation, or privacy interests infringed upon. 
Therefore, this test inadequately protects the right of publicity. 
3. The Alternative Avenues Test 
The “alternative avenues” test was created by the United States 
Supreme Court204 and applied to trademark cases in Mutual of 
Omaha Insurance Co. v. Novak.205 This test’s inquiry is whether 
there are alternative avenues for the expressive work that would 
not infringe on the celebrity’s interests.206 This test is derived from 
real property law.207 The main premise is that just as a landowner 
may exclude speakers from his property if there are alternative 
avenues available to the speaker, a celebrity may restrict the use of 
his or her identity in speech if there are alternative avenues 
available to the artist.208 Several courts have noted the 
awkwardness of analogizing property rights in land to those of 
ideas and words.209 To some, suggesting that alternative words and 
means of expression can be used just as well as the ones selected 
by the artist borders on silly.210 As the famous American author 
Mark Twain stated, “The difference between the almost-right word 
                                                          
203 Id. at 450. 
204 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972). 
205 836 F.2d at 402 (8th Cir. 1987). 
206 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 488 (6th Cir. 2003). 
207 Id. at 449; Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 
604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979). 
208 Parks, 329 F.3d at 449-50. For example, if a shopping mall owner may 
exclude a speaker from his property. Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 567. The Court ruled 
that the shopping mall owner may exclude a speaker from his property if there 
are alternative avenues available to the speaker to get his message across. Id. 
The parallel is thus drawn: a celebrity may prohibit the use of his name or image 
so long as alternative avenues exist for the artist to communicate his idea. Parks, 
329 F.3d at 450.  
209 Parks, 329 F.3d at 450. 
210 Id. 
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and the right word is really a large matter—it’s the difference 
between the ‘lightning-bug’ and the ‘lightning.’”211 There is no 
need to “belabor the point that some words, phrases or symbols 
better convey their intended meanings than others.”212 Therefore, 
the alternative avenues test does not sufficiently accommodate the 
public’s interest in free expression.213 
C. The Key Issues Behind Fashioning an Effective Test 
The primary goal of intellectual property law is maximizing 
creative expression.214 The right of publicity tries to achieve this 
goal by “striking a proper balance between the right of a creator to 
the fruits of his labor and the rights of future creators to free 
expression.”215  “It is admittedly not a simple matter to develop a 
test that will unerringly distinguish between forms of artistic 
expression protected by the First Amendment and those that must 
give way to the right of publicity.”216 Courts do not have much 
guidance because few courts have truly tried to reconcile the two 
rights.217 Cases dealing with the right of publicity only arise 
sporadically nationwide, so there have not been many 
opportunities for courts to address the matter.218 Unsure of how to 
properly deal with the right, courts often look to the entire body of 
law.219 However, this method allows courts to pick and choose 
which cases they want to follow220 and which standard to apply.221 
                                                          
211 J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 527 (16th ed. 1992). 
212 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
213 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). 
214 Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
976 (10th Cir. 1996). 
215 Id. 
216 Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807 (Cal. 2001). 
217 Id. at 805. 
218 Landham v. Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2000). 
219 Id. at 623. 
220 See, e.g., Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 805. Unsure how to proceed, the court 
noted, “we follow those that have in concluding that depictions of celebrities 
amounting to little more than the appropriation of the celebrity’s economic value 
are not protected expressions under the First Amendment.” Id. 
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In fact, some courts have expressed concerns about even applying 
a standard at all.222 Thus, a uniform standard needs to be set.223 
To articulate an exhaustive list of all the ways that publicity is 
protected is to invite clever marketers to discover new ways to 
exploit identities.224 The tests that courts have come up with thus 
far have fallen short of providing adequate protection.225 Even the 
consumer confusion test, which tests whether consumers will 
likely be confused as to a celebrity’s connection to the product, is 
inadequate because it does not balance the First Amendment right 
against the right of publicity.226 
Finally, courts have presented conflicting policy considerations 
of the right of publicity. There are many suggestions to limit the 
right. They include: even pure commercial speech may be found to 
be within First Amendment protection;227 since the right is derived 
                                                          
221 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1002 (2d Cir. 1989). When the 
Second Circuit was faced with a right of publicity claim under the substantive 
law of Oregon, the court grappled with the question of where to start in applying 
a standard. Id. “We are therefore obliged to engage in the uncertain task of 
predicting what the New York courts would predict what the Oregon courts 
would rule as to the contours of the right of publicity under Oregon law.” Id. 
222 Id. at 1005. “[W]e need not, and do not, reach the issue of whether the 
First Amendment would preclude a state from giving broader application to the 
right of publicity.” Id. at 1005 n.13. This is stated, despite the Supreme Court 
already resolving that issue. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 
563, 578-79 (1977). See also text infra §V. 
223 Landham v. Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 622-23 (6th Cir. 2000). 
224 Id. at 624-25. (explaining that if a laundry list is presented, marketers 
will find a loophole around the list. (citing Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
85 F.3d 407, 413-15 (9th Cir. 1996)).  
225 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 448-49 (6th Cir. 2003). See also 
text supra §III. 
226 Id. at 449. The consumer confusion test looks at whether consumers will 
erroneously attribute sponsorship or affiliation of a product to a celebrity, when 
a marketer exploited that celebrity’s persona. Id. If the use is one that a celebrity 
would likely endorse, i.e., use in the form of advertisement, then the use leads to 
such consumer confusion. Id. If the use of the identity is to parody the identity, 
then that use will not lead to consumer confusion. Id. This is because celebrities 
do not endorse a self-parody. Id. See text supra §IV(B)(b) for a further 
discussion of the confusion test. 
227 Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 11028 at *2 (6th Cir. 
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from privacy, a cause of action only exists during the lifetime of 
the celebrity;228 not all states recognize the right;229 copyright law 
preempts the right in many cases;230 an artistic work that is used 
for commercial purposes is not merely a commercial product, but 
is also a means of communication;231 affording celebrities a police 
power to control the use of their identities will restrict public 
discourse to some extent;232 the right will allow celebrities to 
shield themselves from ridicule and criticism;233and it is the media, 
not the celebrity, that has created a market for the identity.234 
Conversely, many other courts have put forth policy 
considerations supporting the right of publicity. While many 
celebrities are highly compensated in their respective fields, a 
majority of their revenue still comes from endorsements.235 The 
right of publicity protects this endorsement value.236 Without this 
protection, identities could be commercially exploited until their 
value was worthless.237 No matter how much celebrities earn in 
their respective fields, if they hold a property interest in their 
identities, it should be protected.238 “People deserve the right to 
profit from the commercial value of their identities, because, quite 
                                                          
2004). 
228 Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001). 
229 Donchez v. Coors Brewing Co., 392 F.3d 1211, 1220 (10th Cir. 2004). 
230 Toney v. L’Oreal U.S.A., Inc., 384 F.3d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 2004). 
231 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 449 (6th Cir. 2003). 
232 Id. 
233 Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
974 (10th Cir. 1996). 
234 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 
1992). Thus, the celebrity does not earn the value of his identity. That value was 
created for him or her. 
235 See, e.g., Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 963. “Since 1966, MLBPA [Major 
League Baseball Players Association] has entered into group licensing 
arrangements for a variety of products, such as candy bars, cookies, cereals, and, 
most importantly, baseball trading cards, which generate over seventy percent of 
its licensing revenues.” Id. (emphasis added). 
236 Id. at 974. 
237 Id. 
238 See id. This is because “publicity rights stem from some notion of 
natural rights.” Id. at 975. 
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simply, they’ve earned it.”239 A celebrity’s identity is his authentic 
seal.240 The identity carries the good name and will of the 
celebrity.241 When another wrongfully uses the identity of someone 
else who has cultivated a good name and will, the user does so 
with the expectation that others will be influenced by the 
reputation which comes along with that good name and will.242 
This wrongful procurement allows the borrower to “ride the coat-
tails” of the celebrity, which itself is an injury to the celebrity, even 
without tarnishing the reputation.243 Thus, unless the borrower’s 
use is so foreign to the owner’s use to ensure against any 
assimilation of the two, it is unlawful.244 
Furthermore, by “[a]llowing individuals the exclusive right to 
capitalize on their persona, like copyright law, [they are 
encouraged] to invest in developing their skills and talents.”245 
Publicity rights also provide incentives to excel in the fields of 
sports and entertainment.246 For instance, there are relatively very 
few actors who manage to create immediately recognizable 
identities, an invaluable asset to an actor.247 The protection of this 
value as a property asset is an incentive to becoming the best in the 
entertainment field.248 Additionally, rights of publicity are 
consistent with the Copyright Act,249 so as not to be preempted by 
                                                          
239 Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
974 (10th Cir. 1996). 
240 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 
F.Supp. 366, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (citing Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 
974 (2d Cir. 1928)). 
241 Id. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. Thus, right of publicity does not focus on tarnishing of name or 
image. See id. 
244 Id. Such a foreign use will not offend the celebrity. See text infra § 
IV(A). 
245 Bosley v. Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 929 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
246 Cardtoons, L.C., v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 
974 (10th Cir. 1996). 
247 Comedy III Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 805 (Cal. 2001). 
248 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 974. 
249 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1998). 
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copyright law.250 
Any distinctive aspect of the persona that identifies the 
celebrity is protected under the right of publicity.251 A plaintiff 
merely has to show commercial value in the identity.252 The right 
is not limited to false endorsement.253 The use of a catch phrase 
that is distinctive to the celebrity,254 a slightly altered picture of a 
famous driver’s race car,255 a drawing of a nude black boxer 
identified by a distinctive nickname,256 and the famous nickname 
of a professional football player as the name of a leg shaving 
cream257 were all found to violate the right of publicity. 
                                                          
250 Landham v. Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 623 (6th Cir. 2000). The 
only time the right will be preempted is when a celebrity already licensed out his 
rights to another, and then is disputing the licensee’s use of the identity in mass 
media. Id. 
251 Id. at 624-25. 
252 Id. at 624. 
253 Id. at 624 n.1. 
254 Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th 
Cir. 1983). Carson was the famous host of the “Tonight Show,” which ran five 
nights a week on broadcast television. Id. at 832. For twenty years Carson was 
introduced onto the show with the line “Here’s Johnny.” Id. Appellee made and 
rented Here’s Johnny portable toilets. Id. at 833. Shortly after appellee went into 
business Carson brought an action against it. Id. The court ruled that in using the 
famous phrase the celebrity’s identity had been misappropriated and exploited. 
Id. 
255 Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th 
Cir. 1974). Plaintiff is an internationally known and recognized racecar driver. 
Id. at 822. Plaintiff also “individualized” his racecar, by making it identifiable as 
his. Id. In a commercial produced by defendant, the defendant used the 
plaintiff’s car. Id. Plaintiff’s face was not visible. Id. The court found that the 
distinguishable racecar would be enough of a likeness of the plaintiff, to bar its 
use. Id. at 827. 
256 Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Ali was 
heavyweight boxing champion of the world. Id. at 725. A portrait of the boxer 
was depicted without permission in an issue of Playgirl Magazine. Id. The 
portrait depicted a nude black man sitting in the corner of a boxing ring. Id. The 
boxer was referred to as “the Greatest.” Id. at 727. This was Ali’s nickname. Id. 
The nude boxer was clearly recognizable as Ali. Id. at 725. The court found this 
was a misappropriation of the boxer’s persona, and granted the boxer an 
injunction. Id. 
257 Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son., Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Wisc. 
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Presently, there is no test that produces consistent outcomes in 
matters of publicity rights.258 Therefore, a new test must be 
proposed.  However, this new test must insulate from restriction 
works with sufficient artistic relevance that are ambiguous or only 
implicitly misleading, but leave vulnerable works that are 
explicitly misleading as to source or content, or have minimal or 
no artistic relevance at all.259 Only in this manner will the test 
resolve the conflicting interests of the First Amendment and the 
individual’s interests in rights of publicity. 
IV. A NEW THREE-PRONG TEST TO CONSISTENTLY ADJUDICATE 
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 
The following section outlines the proposed right of publicity 
test and illustrates its application and effectiveness with case-based 
hypotheticals. 
                                                          
1979). Hirsch, a professional football player was nicknamed “Crazylegs.” Id. at 
131. Defendant used that nickname to market their products. Id. at 132. The 
court found that such misappropriation is enough to be considered unlawful. Id. 
at 140. 
258 Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 448-49 (6th Cir. 2003). Even 
the Rogers balancing test comes up short in this respect. See text supra 
§III(B)(2). No one test that is already in case law adequately balances the 
interests of artists and celebrities. However, it is possible to suggest a single test 
that can answer the right of publicity question in every case. See text infra § 
IV(A). 
259 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000 (2d Cir. 1989). The court states 
how federal trademark law accommodates consumer and artistic interest. “It 
insulates from restriction titles with at least minimal artistic relevance that are 
ambiguous or only implicitly misleading but leaves vulnerable to claims of 
deception titles that are explicitly misleading as to source or content, or that 
have no artistic relevance at all.” Id. Note the higher standard that Rogers 
provides. Id. That is because titles deserve more protection than ordinary works. 
Id. at 997. The new test suggested here does just this. See text infra § III(B)(2). 
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A. The New Test 
1. The “Purpose” Prong 
The first inquiry goes to the purpose of the defendant’s use of 
another’s persona. When there is no expressive speech or action, 
there is no First Amendment protection.260 Exploiting an identity 
without adding any expressive elements will violate publicity 
rights and will not invoke First Amendment protections.261 A work 
in which the expressive element, such as a parody, is subservient to 
the commercial element, such as the sale of a product, will also not 
be shielded from right of publicity claims.262 Like the 
transformative elements test, this first purpose prong asks whether 
there are any additional elements added to the work that illuminate 
the purpose of the work.263 An important inquiry is whether the 
                                                          
260 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1184-85 (2001) 
(finding that if the “commercial aspects [of a work] are inextricably entwined 
with [its] expressive elements,” the work will have “a measure of First 
Amendment protection”). 
261 Id. (use of altered movie still in print ad to sell clothes); Newcombe v. 
Adolph Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 691 (9th Cir. 1998) (using a baseball pitcher’s 
image in printed beer ad); Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 409 
(9th Cir. 1996) (use of basketball player’s former name in television 
commercial); Waits v. Frito-Lay Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1097-98 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(imitating famous singer’s voice in snack-food commercial); Midler v. Ford 
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988) (use of sound-alike rendition of 
singer’s song in a car commercial) (all not protected by First Amendment). 
262 White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 
1992). Additionally, where the parody is invoked in bad faith, used in order to 
justify exploiting of an image, it will not be protected. Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366, 375 (D.C.N.Y. 
1979). When film footage of a celebrity is used to sell itself, and is not 
accompanied by editorial comments, the film will not be protected. Bosley v. 
Wildwett.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 928 (N.D. Ohio 2004). Even an 
impersonation, if not accompanied by any comment, will not be protected. 
Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981) (finding that 
an Elvis impersonator’s concerts constituted a copying of Elvis Presley’s 
persona and was not protected by the First Amendment). 
263 Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808 (Cal. 
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creative elements predominate.264 If the purpose of the work is to 
express something,265 then it triggers potential First Amendment 
protection. However, if the purpose is to exploit the image for 
monetary gain with very little creative manipulation of the image, 
then it leans more toward violating the publicity rights of the 
celebrity.266 
2. The “Confusion/Dilution” Prong 
After the purpose of the work is determined, courts should next 
examine the harmful effects of the identity exploitation, namely, 
confusion and dilution.267 A court in a right of publicity case uses 
                                                          
2001). 
264 Id. at 810 (“We ask, in other words, whether a product containing a 
celebrity’s likeness is so transformed that it has become primarily the 
defendant’s own expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness.”). This test is 
not the end of the inquiry, however. In Winter v. DC Comics, the court applied 
the transformative elements test. 69 P.3d 473, 477 (Cal. 2003). The court found 
that a comic book exploited the likenesses of two musicians, but had creative 
elements, and was protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 479. The comic 
book had clear appropriations of the musicians. Id. at 476. The comic included 
long white hair, albino features, and tall black hat that were signatures of the 
plaintiffs. Id. Additionally, the title use, “Autumns of Our Discontent,” was 
clearly an appropriation of the plaintiffs’ names. Id. The plaintiffs’ name was 
Winter. Id. There is a Shakespearian phrase “winter of our discontent” in 
Richard III, act I, scene I, lines 1-2. Id. at 476 n.1. Even with evidence of clear 
appropriation, the court found for the defendant. Id. at 479. That is because there 
were transformative elements, like making the musicians into alien worm 
creatures. Id. Thus, the transformative elements test, that does not consider 
confusion, is clearly only a start to the inquiry. See text supra § III(B)(1). 
265 This expression must be something other than the likeness, or to sell a 
product. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809. 
266 After this inquiry, the harmful effects must be determined. These are 
confusion and dilution. The reason why the inquiry cannot end here, is that the 
full breadth of the policy considerations cannot be evaluated until the harmful 
effects of the work are determined. See text supra §III(B). The more the work is 
used to sell, the more it is commercial speech and is afforded less First 
Amendment protection. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
267 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 948 (6th Cir 2003) 
(Clay, J., dissenting). 
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the eight-factor inquiry adopted by courts in trademark cases in 
order to measure the amount of confusion created by the identity 
exploitation. 268 The eight factors are not used in a precise 
mathematical way, but merely as a guide.269 As trademark and 
right of publicity claims are similar in that the harm to plaintiffs in 
both cases revolves around confusion and dilution, these eight 
factors will be strong indicators of right of publicity violations. A 
key factor in the inquiry is whether the use of the identity in the 
product or work will create consumer confusion as to source, 
affiliation, or sponsorship.270 That is, the court must ask whether 
consumers believe that a celebrity is associated with the product.271 
A second factor is whether the use of the identity in the product or 
work will dilute the value of the identity.272 This assumes that any 
profit off of the fame of a celebrity would likely diminish the value 
of the celebrity’s endorsement value.273 If identities are used 
                                                          
268 Landham v. Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 627 (6th Cir. 2000). The 
eight factors are: (1) strength of plaintiff’s mark; (2) relatedness of the goods; 
(3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing 
channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) defendant’s intent in 
selecting the mark; (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. Id. at 626-
27. There is no need to prove actual confusion. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 
F.3d 437, 460 (6th Cir. 2003). 
269 Landham, 227 F.3d at 627. 
270 Parks,329 F.3d at 445-46. 
271 Id. at 445. Confusion and dilution may be intertwined. If the use of an 
identity will lead consumers to believe that the celebrity is behind the product, 
then that is a product that the celebrity may want to endorse. It follows that 
confusion is found more easily in products or works that the celebrity would be 
more likely to endorse. If a celebrity would be less likely to endorse a product or 
work, then the use of an identity will be less likely to cause consumer confusion. 
See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992). 
272 Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774, 777 (8th Cir. 2004). See also 
text supra § I(B). 
273 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1003-04 (2d Cir. 1989). Taking a free 
ride off of the fame is tantamount to unjust enrichment. Cardtoons, L.C., v. 
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996). Even 
using the identity of one celebrity to make fun of another will violate the right of 
publicity. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2002). 
However, using a celebrity’s identity to make fun of that celebrity is fully First 
Amendment protected. Id. 
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without paying for them, then identities lose their marketability.274 
Accordingly the higher degree of confusion and dilution the more 
harmful the identity exploitation is, and the more vulnerable to 
attack the work becomes.275 
3. The “Balancing” Prong 
After determining the purpose of a work as a function of its 
expressive elements and harmful identity exploitation in the first 
two prongs, public interest concerns are evaluated.276 The policy 
considerations behind the right of publicity are balanced against 
those of free expression.277 A court will have to evaluate the extent 
of the commercial aspects of the work,278 coupled with the extent 
of harm it will likely cause,279 and determine whether or not the 
public interest in a free marketplace of ideas prevails. For instance, 
if the purpose of the work is to sell itself or a product, and it will 
likely lead to consumer confusion and dilution,280 then the right of 
publicity will prevail. However, if the work’s main purpose is to 
express an idea, and there is little likelihood of confusion or 
dilution,281 then the First Amendment will protect the work. In this 
way, the elements are truly in balance.282 
                                                          
274 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1004. 
275 After determining the amount of expression and harmful exploitation a 
work has, it is then time to balance the interests behind rights of publicity and 
free expression. 
276 Rogers, 875 F.2d at 999. 
277 Id. 
278 I.e., what its purpose is. 
279 I.e., the level of confusion and dilution. 
280 I.e., in advertising. 
281 I.e., a parody. 
282 When the commercial, confusion, and dilution aspects are found more 
prevalent, the interest in protecting this work absconds. As the expressive and 
creative elements start to dominate, then the right of publicity gives way to the 
protection of the First Amendment. See text supra §III(B). 
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B. Application of the New Test 
Applying the new test to different hypothetical situations 
inspired by actual cases will demonstrate how the test is properly 
applied. The hypotheticals will also show how the proposed test 
can be uniformly applied to differing types of right of publicity 
actions. 
1. Appropriation of Photograph Case 
A publisher creates a monthly calendar.283 In the calendar, the 
producer uses multiple photographic images of the legendary 
baseball player Babe Ruth. The baseball great appears three times 
in the calendar. Ruth’s daughters bring an action asserting the right 
of publicity along with state and federal trademark claims. 
Applying the new test to the right of publicity claim, the court 
will first determine the purpose of the image appropriation. The 
court will look at the calendar to find out if the use of Ruth’s image 
is to express an idea or to sell the calendar. The purpose is likely to 
sell as many calendars as possible by including photographs of the 
American icon. There is no commentary accompanying the 
photographs. There are virtually hundreds of different kinds of 
calendars on the market. The photographs were probably necessary 
                                                          
283 This hypothetical is taken from the facts in Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 
894 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1990). Baseball has been America’s national pastime 
since the early 1900s. Id. at 580. One such ball player, “Babe Ruth[,] hardly 
needs an introduction.” Id. Ruth was often paid by manufacturers for the use of 
his picture on their products. Id. at 581. The defendant calendar maker created a 
calendar. Id. This calendar did not feature Ruth’s name anywhere on the front or 
back cover. Id. The calendar contained pictures of many great baseball players. 
Id. The calendar also included three photographs of Babe Ruth. Id. The court 
found for the defendant. Id. at 583. It stated that, “a photograph of a human 
being, unlike a portrait of a fanciful cartoon character, is not inherently 
‘distinctive’ in the trademark sense.” Id. The court concluded that an ordinarily 
prudent consumer would think that although the celebrity is the subject matter of 
the calendar it by no means indicates sponsorship. Id. at 585. This is clearly 
misguided reasoning. The court does not explain why a consumer, seeing all the 
photographs of the celebrity, will think that it was an appropriation and not from 
the celebrity himself. 
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to give the calendar a marketing edge. Thus, the primary purpose 
appears to be to use the image for commercial purposes. 
Next, the court must determine whether the photographs cause 
confusion as to affiliation, sponsorship, or source, and dilution by 
lessening the endorsement value of the image. The calendar may 
confuse consumers, who, upon seeing the photographs in the 
calendar, may think that it has some affiliation or approval from 
Babe Ruth’s estate.284 The calendar may also cause dilution 
because a calendar is something that a celebrity may want to sell 
endorsement rights for in order to make a profit. In fact, celebrities 
endorse a variety of common products.285 In this circumstance, the 
defendant’s free use of the photograph in the calendar likely 
diminishes the endorsement value of the celebrity’s image.286 
Thus, there is harm in the exploitation. 
Finally, the competing interests—free expression on one hand, 
and privacy and property on the other hand—must be balanced. 
Exploitation for commercial purposes is present, with few, if any, 
expressive elements. Ruth’s image was inserted in the calendar in 
order to differentiate the calendar from others in the eyes of 
consumers. This was to help sell more calendars. Additionally, 
there is the high likelihood of confusion and dilution. Many 
consumers would believe that Ruth’s license holders endorsed the 
calendar. Additionally, using the image without paying for it 
decreases the endorsement value of the image. Marketers will not 
want to pay for an image that they can use for free. Therefore, the 
right of publicity outweighs that of free expression.287 
                                                          
284 Or, whomever holds the rights to his image. 
285 The list includes T-shirts, watches, lunch boxes, photo frames, and 
towels. 
286 Advertisers and product designers will not pay for likenesses that can be 
obtained for free. While this is one example, this can create a dangerous 
precedent. 
287 After all, there is no expression in this product. 
 A similar hypothetical can be drawn from Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. 
Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). The Three Stooges were a huge comedy 
hit in their day. The group was made up by Moe, Jerome “Curly” Howard, and 
Larry Fein. Starting in vaudeville and then later in movie shorts, the trio were at 
the top of their profession for twenty years. During these years they developed 
their own style incorporating “nyuk-nyuk,” “whoop-whoop-whoop,” eye pokes, 
SCHLACHTER MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006  12:42 PM 
 RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 513 
2. Appropriation  of Identity 
An actor stars in a low-budget movie which unexpectedly 
becomes very popular.288 Afterwards, a toy company starts to 
produce, market, and sell action figures based on the characters in 
the movie. Each of these figures, though diminutive, have a very 
clear resemblance to the actors that played the parts in the 
movie.289 At no time did the actor sign a waiver of his rights to his 
                                                          
and head conks. Their images have become synonymous with comedy and a 
distinct brand of physical humor. Defendant artist, who had over twenty-five 
years of experience, draw a depiction of the famous trio. He sold that depiction 
on lithographs, silkscreen, and on T-shirts. The charcoal drawing was original in 
that it did not copy any existing photograph of the trio. It did, however, literally 
depict the comedian group. Comedy III, the registered owner of all rights to the 
former comedy act, sued to protect their publicity rights. 
 Plugging this fact pattern into the new test is simple. The purpose of the 
charcoal drawing is to literally depict the trio. That is, to capitalize off of their 
fame. The depiction was sold as lithographs, and put on T-shirts, in order to sell 
to fans. There was no message in the drawing, other than to identify the images 
of The Three Stooges. While artwork is protected by the First Amendment, that 
is expressive art, or art that does not violate anyone else’s rights. A work that 
exploits the image of a celebrity will not be automatically protected. 
 Consumer confusion is very likely in this case. Since the depictions are 
literal, and were sold as prints or on T-shirts, consumers will very likely be led 
to believe that The Three Stooges were affiliated with the products. While all 
members of the trio are dead, their rights belong to Comedy III. As for dilution, 
T-shirts and prints are common avenues for celebrities to sell endorsements. 
Endorsements are not only sold for advertising, but for product placement as 
well. Therefore, by using the images without compensating the celebrity, it 
causes a dilution of the value of the identity. Additionally, it is taking a free ride 
on the fame of the celebrity. This is unjust enrichment. 
Balancing First Amendment and publicity rights are relatively simple. There are 
not that many expressive elements in the work, but there is a lot of harmful 
exploitation. Therefore, summary judgment should be granted to the plaintiff. 
The right of publicity should be firmly upheld. 
288 This hypothetical is taken from the facts in Landham v. Lewis Galoob 
Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000). 
289 In Landham the toys that were made were tiny, with no clear 
resemblance at all to any of the actors. Id. at 622. In fact, the toy designer 
purposely avoided any resemblance. Id. Therefore, no right of publicity 
violation was found. Id. at 627. 
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character in the movie, and the production company never 
contracted with him to retain all marketing rights in the film.290 
The actor sues to protect his publicity rights. 
In applying the proposed three-pronged test, the court first 
looks at the purpose of the toy company using the likeness of the 
actor. The clear purpose of the toys is twofold. One, to create a toy 
that evokes the character played in the move. Two, based on this 
evocation, sell the toys. Thus, the predominant purpose is to 
exploit the character’s image to sell the toys. 
Next, the court weighs the confusion and dilution. The 
appropriation may not be harmful. First, as to confusion, most 
consumers would probably think that the movie, not the actor, is 
associated with the toy. Unless otherwise demonstrated, few 
consumers would think that the actor solely authorized the making 
of the toy. In fact, it is likely that the consumers do not care if the 
toy looks like the actor or not. The main purpose of the action 
figure is to evoke the image of the character, not necessarily the 
actor that starred in the role.291 Therefore, there is not much 
likelihood of consumer confusion as to affiliation. 
Dilution would have a similar analysis. While an actor may 
want to endorse action figures which depict his or her likeness, 
there may not be an actual opportunity to do so. The lack of an 
opportunity is because when a toy company obtains a license from 
movie producers, often it is only after an actor has waived his or 
her rights to the characters.292 Therefore, dilution may not be 
                                                          
290 Presumably, most major production companies make it standard 
practice to reserve all marketing rights stemming from their films, but in the 
case of an indie film, such a precaution may not seem critical. Therefore, this 
hypothetical contemplates a situation in which all bets are off when it comes to 
the actor exploiting his own character. 
291 The toy would have the same appeal no matter who played in the role. 
Although some main characters become famous because of who starred in the 
role, i.e., the Terminator starring Arnold Schwarzennegger, the majority become 
famous because of the movie. Thus, in most instances, consumers do not care 
who the toy looks like, as long as it is the character from the movie. This is 
especially true for characters that wear masks and the like, concealing the 
identity of the actor. Some examples are Darth Vader from Star Wars, Batman, 
and Spider-Man. 
292 Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2000). 
SCHLACHTER MACROED.DOC 4/18/2006  12:42 PM 
 RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 515 
present because although this particular toy company can produce 
the toy that evokes the image, others that want to evoke the image 
would still have to obtain a license. 
In balancing, however, the right of publicity would prevail. 
While the public interest in preventing publicity exploitation is 
weak in this case, due to the lack of harmful exploitation, there is 
no expression that is to be protected. The identity on the toy is 
clearly commercially related. Therefore, in a case where the actor 
did not waive his right to the character he plays, a toy company 
will have to seek his permission before creating a toy that evokes 
his likeness.293 
                                                          
293 This will lead to toy manufacturers having to get licensing from the 
studio and from the actor. However, that is only if the toy looks like the actor. If 
it only looks like the character, then licensing will only need to be obtained from 
the movie studio. Id. at 626. 
 This can be compared to a hypothetical drawn from Hoffman v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001). Dustin Hoffman plays a 
character that dresses up like a woman in order to get a part on a daytime 
television soap opera. A memorable still from the movie is a shot of the male 
actor dressing up like a woman. He is wearing a long-sleeved red evening gown. 
Years later a magazine wants to show off its prowess in computer graphics. It 
takes the famous still, along with many others, and alters them. The article 
replaced the bodies of the famous actors and replaced them with male models 
sporting the fall fashion. In the case of this particular actor, it kept the head as is, 
but replaced the body with that of a male model. The model was wearing a 
spaghetti strapped, cream colored, evening gown. It included a caption that read 
“Dustin Hoffman isn’t a drag in the butter-colored silk gown by Richard Tyler 
and Ralph Lauren heels.” The actor then sued to protect his publicity value. 
 The purpose of the article was to express an idea. That idea is what actors in 
famous roles would look like wearing the fall line. The purpose was not merely 
to exploit the image, but to lampoon it. The parody is not of the actor, but 
putting the actor in a silly situation. Thus, the lampooning was more of the still 
than of the actor. Either way, the expressive element stays the same. That is, to 
illustrate the power of computer graphics. The caption under the altered 
photograph went along with this theme. 
 There is little likelihood that consumers will think any of the actors, 
including Dustin Hoffman, is affiliated with the article. For one, it is in a 
magazine. It is very unlikely that magazines have to pay celebrities every time 
they want to include an image along with an article. Another reason, is that it 
lampoons the memorable roles. Few actors would want to reduce their 
memorable role to a scene of them in women’s clothing. As for dilution, it 
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3. Appropriation of Image Case 
A poster for sale is created that depicts a robot.294 The robot 
has male features, an African-American complexion, and a bald 
head. The robot is wearing black high-top basketball sneakers, a 
red basketball uniform with black trim, baggy shorts, and the 
number 23 on the jersey.295 The poster depicts the robot dunking a 
basketball one-handed, stiff armed. The arms and legs are spread 
out, like scissors, and the tongue is hanging out. Seeing this, famed 
basketball player Michael Jordan296 sues the poster company under 
a right of publicity claim.297 Jordan asserts that the robot is 
depicting his likeness. 
Consider the three prongs of the proposed test.298 First, the 
purpose prong. The robot appears to be evoking the image of 
Michael Jordan: it is wearing a uniform that is very similar to his 
Chicago Bulls299 uniform, “23” is the number he wore, and the 
                                                          
follows the same reasoning. That is, it does not diminish endorsement value, 
because celebrities will not want to endorse such an article. Additionally, it is an 
article, and celebrities do not usually endorse articles. 
 The policy here is clear. The article contains definite expressive elements. 
The exploitation of the identity is necessary to convey the ideas expressed. This 
exploitation is also not harmful. Therefore, the public interest in free expression 
clearly prevails. 
294 This hypothetical is posed in White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 
F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). 
295 While this is famed Chicago Bulls basketball player Michael Jordan’s 
number, it does not say “Jordan” or “Bulls” anywhere on the uniform. 
296 Former professional basketball superstar. 
297 The hypothetical, as posed in White, has this image as part of an 
advertisement. 971 F.2d at 1399. It is used as a plain poster in order to isolate 
the image exploitation aspect. If it would be used as an advertisement, then there 
would be even more reason to believe the image represents commercial speech. 
298 “Considered individually, the robot’s physical attributes, its dress, and 
its stance tell us little.” White, F.2d at 1399. The court notes, however, that 
“Taken together, they lead to the only conclusion that any sports viewer who has 
registered a discernable pulse in the past five years would reach: the ad is about 
Michael Jordan.” Id. 
299 A professional basketball team, part of the National Basketball 
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arms, legs, and tongue are all in his signature positions. The use of 
the image appears to be in order to sell the poster. A poster is only 
sold because of the image on it, not for the value it has as paper. 
The image, however, does contain expressive elements. Here, the 
poster undoubtedly imitates the plaintiff basketball superstar. This 
makes the poster a parody. The impersonation, however, is the end 
of the expression. The poster does not comment specifically on the 
ballplayer. It merely is expressing that this robot is like Michael 
Jordan.300 Thus, there are commercial and expressive elements, 
neither set particularly stronger than the other. 
Second is the confusion and dilution prong in order to judge 
the harmfulness of the appropriation. In this case there is a 
likelihood of confusion present, but it is not very strong. While a 
celebrity will want to sponsor posters of him or herself, a robotic 
depiction is arguably not the usual goal. Therefore, a consumer 
may think that the celebrity had something to do with the poster, 
but it is not a very strong inference.301 On the same token, this 
depiction is not the type of parody that lampoons the player, and so 
it is not unthinkable that the player somehow approves or is 
affiliated with the poster.302 As for diluting endorsement value, this 
depiction is not an avenue that the player usually would endorse. A 
player would endorse a poster with an actual image, perhaps, but 
not one of a robot that merely depicts his likeness. However, this 
poster is taking a free ride on the fame of the celebrity. The artist 
                                                          
Association. 
300 Expressing likeness is not considered creative expression. Comedy III 
Prod. v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001). 
301 Using the eight-factor test as guidance, confusion is found. The 
characteristic pose along with the number and red uniform lead to a likelihood 
of confusion. There is a strong mark, the goods are related and similar, 
marketing channels are the same, there is a low degree of purchaser care for 
posters, and the intent of using the mark was to exploit the image. As for 
evidence of actual confusion and expansion of product lines, those lean toward 
the defendant. Therefore, there would be confusion found. 
302 To a certain extent, celebrities welcome well thought out parodies. 
Parodies done in good taste, that don’t criticize the celebrity, but merely make 
fun, are found to be endorsed by the celebrities themselves. In fact, in many 
occasions celebrities play cameo parts in movies or in advertisements that poke 
fun at them. 
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likely used a robot instead of an actual image of Jordan in order to 
escape paying endorsement fees. The parody is a way to market 
posters of the celebrity to fans without paying compensation.303 
Therefore, there is only a small likelihood of confusion, but a great 
amount of dilution. 
As for balancing the free expression and property and privacy 
interests, the interests are well-balanced; that is, neither interest is 
particularly strong. Although there is clear image exploitation, the 
exploitation would not likely be considered injurious to the 
celebrity’s publicity value because celebrities do not generally 
endorse parodies. At the same time, however, there is not much 
expression in this work. While the poster expresses that the player 
sticks his tongue out while playing basketball, that is the totality of 
the expressed ideas. This image use is an example of the artist 
capitalizing off of the fame of the celebrity. Rights of publicity 
protect such unjust enrichment and freeloading. Free expression 
does not have much at stake in this work because little is known of 
the artist’s opinion of the basketball player. Ultimately, an 
injunction to protect the ballplayer’s persona should likely be 
granted to the ballplayer because the purpose of the poster is 
commercial gain, and not substantive commentary on Jordan.304 
                                                          
303 Depicting the celebrity in this way will get around paying for the 
identity. Although the celebrity will not want to endorse this poster, but the 
celebrity will want to endorse posters. By not using any actual image of the 
celebrity, the artist is trying to market a product to the fans of the basketball 
player without having to pay licensing fee. Therefore, there is dilution. This is 
an example of taking a free ride off of the fame of a celebrity without 
compensating the celebrity. This then, is also unjust enrichment. 
304 The defendant can easily escape liability in this case if there was more 
expression in the poster. Perhaps show money trailing out of the pocket of the 
uniform, or add springs to the bottom of the sneakers. However, this may defeat 
the artist’s purpose. It seems that the artist may want to market this poster to 
those who hold Michael Jordan in high regard. Therefore, the artist would not 
want to lampoon the celebrity this way. 
 A similar hypothetical is derived from the facts in White v. Samsung Elecs. 
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). An electronics company created a vast 
print ad marketing campaign. The main theme was showing its products in the 
context of twenty years in the future. It used a mixture of celebrities and 
common items for the campaign. An example is showing raw meat with the 
caption “Revealed to be health food, year 2025.” Another showed a talk-show 
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host in front of an American flag with the caption “Presidential Candidate, year 
2020.” All of the advertisements depicting celebrities were done with 
permission. The one exception was the one that is up for dispute. This 
advertisement featured a robot with female features, white gown, pearls, and 
blond wig. It was posed in front of a game board which was instantly recognized 
as the Wheel of Fortune game-show set. The look and stance of the robot was 
clearly modeled after Wheel of Fortune game-show hostess Vanna White. The 
caption read “Longest-running game show. 2012 A.D..” This advertisement was 
selling VCRs. Upon seeing this ad, the hostess sued to protect her identity. 
 The purpose of the advertisement is clearly to sell the VCRs. Although it 
parodies the game show and its hostess, that is just an incidental purpose of the 
commercial message. The parody message is clearly expressive. It states that the 
game show is very popular and will still be running twenty years in the future, as 
illustrating, in exaggerated form, the famous aspects of its hostess. Still, the 
main purpose of the advertisement is to be an advertisement. That is, to sell the 
VCRs. 
 This advertisement will not likely lead to consumer confusion. Consumers 
will not think that the game show is affiliated with the ad. If the game show 
would be affiliated with the ad, the depiction of the game show would be a lot 
more literal. Since the ad only depicts the readily recognizable aspects of the 
show without any literal depictions, it is most likely viewed as a parody. 
Parodies of this kind are not likely affiliated with the producers of the game 
show, even if it does depict the show in a positive light. It is less likely affiliated 
with Vanna White, its hostess. However, there might be some confusion as to 
permission or approval of the depiction. As for dilution, there is no direct 
diminishing of the celebrity value. The hostess will not likely endorse such a 
parody. It is not literal enough. However, the ad does capitalize off of her 
famous identity. Her persona is used without compensating her. Thus, the ad is 
taking a free ride off of her hard work and talent. Therefore, there is dilution, 
exploitation, and unjust enrichment. 
 It is not simple to balance these rights. There clearly is a message. The 
advertisement parodies the game-show and its hostess, and therefore has 
expressive elements. By the same token, the purpose of the advertisement 
reveals its commercial purpose. Additionally, the identity exploitation is 
harmful. Although there is not a strong likelihood of consumer confusion, and 
no direct dilution, there is the capitalizing off of the identity. This capitalization 
diminishes endorsement value by finding an alternative way to reach fans of the 
celebrity without paying for licensing rights. Therefore, even though this is a 
close case, summary judgment should have been given to plaintiff. 
 This hypothetical is an example of a parody not done correctly. When a 
parody is not done correctly, it loses its expressive potency. When a parody is 
intertwined with commercial elements, like trying to sell a product, then the 
parody is less effective in it of itself. Therefore, it receives less protection than 
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CONCLUSION 
The right of publicity is a difficult and elusive area of law. The 
right’s basis in two different areas of law has caused more 
confusion than comfort, as demonstrated by the various and 
divergent outcomes in cases dealing with the right of publicity. In 
exhibiting both privacy and property aspects the right has a wide 
range of interests. However, while the interests of the right are 
apparent, courts have historically struggled to determine what 
protections the rights of publicity afford. A primary concern is the 
interplay between the right and the First Amendment. By 
protecting the marketplace of ideas and expression, the First 
Amendment puts a limitation on the breadth of the right of 
publicity. Intellectual property and the right of publicity in turn, 
put limitations on the First Amendment as well. There is great 
dispute among courts as to how far each of these limitations 
extend. Unsure, courts have been more inclined to limit the right of 
publicity than the First Amendment. 
The First Amendment is by far not absolute. The First 
Amendment’s protection extends only to the expressive elements 
of a work. A work will incidentally be protected if it contains 
sufficient expressive elements. When there are commercial or 
identity-exploitative elements in a work, the work will be afforded 
less protection. Thus is the interaction between the First 
Amendment and the right of publicity. In a work that contains both 
expressive and identity exploitative elements, there will be friction 
between the rights of free expression and publicity. Each right will 
protect its respective interest in the work. Therefore, a court must 
balance the rights to find which one outweighs the other. 
Precise balancing is what has troubled courts. Many courts find 
the task daunting and have shied away from it. Others have tackled 
it head on, albeit misguidedly. Still others have tried to gingerly 
strike a delicate balance. All these approaches, however, have met 
little success. The task of balancing the rights still looms 
dauntingly before courts. The unbalanced and haphazard 
                                                          
parodies whose purpose is to convey a message. 
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approaches used have only led to more confusion.305 Such 
approaches have also led to injustice.306 Aside from the courts, the 
parties in right of publicity disputes are left without any direction. 
Celebrities are unsure of how to plead a right of publicity case, 
while artists have no clear guideline of how much their work may 
incorporate the identity of another. 
A growing concern is the lack of appreciation some courts have 
for the policy considerations for the right of publicity. Many courts 
choose only to list the public policy against the right which helps 
justify limiting the right. These courts, though, are unwittingly 
diminishing the property right of the celebrity. No good reason has 
been put forward to explain why the First Amendment’s right of 
free expression should automatically trump the Fifth Amendment’s 
right to property. Without a clear understanding of the public 
interest in upholding the right, courts will continue to disregard it. 
On the contrary, courts should realize the great public interest that 
the right of publicity carries. The right of publicity prevents the 
misappropriation of a valuable identity, one that the celebrity 
worked very hard in creating. The right gives the celebrity the sole 
right to exploit his or her identity. The right also prevents unjust 
enrichment, consumer confusion, and the dilution of the celebrity’s 
property interest. In this way, it is quite akin to trademark law. 
Therefore, better understanding and respect should be paid toward 
the property interests the right is protecting. 
In light of the need to protect both the valuable identity and the 
free market of ideas, a proper balancing test is needed. Courts 
should adopt an approach that will incorporate the interests of both 
parties. In order for this to happen, courts must acknowledge the 
need to uphold the purposes of both parties’ rights. Only then can a 
proper balance be struck. This Note proposed a three-pronged test 
that can accomplish the goal of balancing the rights. The first 
prong is to consider the purpose of the work in question. This will 
determine if the work is primarily to convey a message, or for the 
most part trying to sell something. The next prong is to consider 
how harmful the identity exploitation is. If the persona use will 
                                                          
305 See text supra § III(A)-(B). 
306 See text supra § III(A). 
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likely cause consumer confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship 
then it will be found to be harmful. Persona use will also be 
harmful if the use dilutes the value of the identity it is using, or 
tries to capitalize on the fame of another. Finally, the last prong 
balances the opposing interests in the work. The expressive 
components are weighed against the commercial and identity 
exploitative components to find if the First Amendment or the right 
of publicity will prevail. In this way, publicity and free expression 
rights are firmly upheld. With this test, courts and parties will have 
clear guidance of how to act in regard to the identity rights of 
celebrities. 
Indeed, because of the necessity in upholding both the public 
interest in free expression and right of publicity, jurisdictions 
nationwide are urged to adopt the right of publicity in this way. 
The states that have not yet adopted any form of the right of 
publicity should do so immediately. The states that have already 
adopted the right via the common law or statute should consider 
modifying their case law to adequately protect both of these 
interests. The test this Note suggests may be adopted or used as 
guidance. When limiting or expanding the right of publicity, the 
public has much at stake. Artists and merchants need guidelines for 
determining when identity exploitation is permissible. 
Furthermore, celebrities deserve protection for their identities and 
personas. Thus, many members of our society have a stake in how 
the balance is struck.307 Federal courts should acknowledge that 
there exists a federal common law right of publicity as well. 
Thereby, all courts should consider the need for adoption of a 
formal balancing standard. As the Supreme Court has not heard a 
right of publicity case since 1977, it is quite obvious that the issue 
is overdue before the Court. If the Court carefully strikes a proper 
balance between the two competing interests, other courts 
nationwide will finally obtain some clarity. Only then will this 
issue no longer daunt courts, but be one of the many laws in our 
                                                          
307 Indeed, living in a capitalist society, every member of society has the 
potential to become an artist, merchant, celebrity, or all three. Therefore, every 
member of society has a stake in how the right of publicity and its interplay with 
the First Amendment is defined. Therefore, it is imperative for courts to adopt a 
clear method for balancing the rights. 
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jurisprudence that will protect the interests of all parties. 
 
